TY - JOUR
T1 - From Cryptocurrencies to Cryptocourts: Blockchain and the Financialization of Dispute Resolution Platforms
AU - Dylag, Matthew
N1 - © 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
PY - 2023/1/1
Y1 - 2023/1/1
N2 - This paper contributes to emerging discussions of blockchain governance through an analysis of dispute resolution platforms that reimagine justice. We focus specifically on Kleros, a blockchain-enabled dispute resolution platform, that promises to secure, authenticate, and democratize access to justice for the twenty-first century. We advance the concept of cryptocourts whereby jurors, incentivized by accumulating cryptocurrency, rapidly mobilize using principles of on-demand crowdsourcing to resolve disputes. We critique the broader social imaginaries that cryptocourts such as Kleros will result in a more open, trustworthy, transparent, and democratic systems of justice. These platforms instead pose important questions concerning their potential impact on civil dispute resolution practices by embedding it within an economy of cryptocurrency speculation. This ostensibly results in a legal infrastructure founded on principles of financial acquisition that positions jurors as economic agents seeking to profit from disputes, and courts as computational systems that merely authenticate and secure the distribution of evidence and verdicts.
AB - This paper contributes to emerging discussions of blockchain governance through an analysis of dispute resolution platforms that reimagine justice. We focus specifically on Kleros, a blockchain-enabled dispute resolution platform, that promises to secure, authenticate, and democratize access to justice for the twenty-first century. We advance the concept of cryptocourts whereby jurors, incentivized by accumulating cryptocurrency, rapidly mobilize using principles of on-demand crowdsourcing to resolve disputes. We critique the broader social imaginaries that cryptocourts such as Kleros will result in a more open, trustworthy, transparent, and democratic systems of justice. These platforms instead pose important questions concerning their potential impact on civil dispute resolution practices by embedding it within an economy of cryptocurrency speculation. This ostensibly results in a legal infrastructure founded on principles of financial acquisition that positions jurors as economic agents seeking to profit from disputes, and courts as computational systems that merely authenticate and secure the distribution of evidence and verdicts.
KW - cryptocurrencies
KW - Bitcoin
KW - Blockchain governance
KW - Kleros
KW - dispute resolution platforms
KW - on-demand crowdsourcing
M3 - Article
SN - 1369-118X
VL - 26
JO - Information Communication and Society
JF - Information Communication and Society
IS - 2
ER -